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Abstract
One of the main objectives of data mining is to help
companies determine to which potential customers
to market and how many resources to allocate to
these potential customers. Most previous works on
competitive influence in social networks focus on
the first issue. In this work, our focus is on the
second issue, i.e., we are interested on the competi-
tive influence of marketing campaigns who need to
simultaneously decide how many resources to allo-
cate to their potential customers to advertise their
products. Using results from game theory, we are
able to completely characterize the optimal strate-
gic resource allocation for the voter model of social
networks and prove that the price of competition
of this game is unbounded. This work is a step to-
wards providing a solid foundation for marketing
advertising in more general scenarios.
1 Introduction
In contrast to mass marketing, where a product
is promoted indiscriminately to all potential cus-
tomers, direct marketing promotes a product only
to customers likely to be profitable. The ground-
breaking works of Domingos and Richardson [7, 27]
incorporated the influence of peers on the deci-
sion making process of potential customers decid-
ing between different products or services promoted
by competing marketing campaigns through direct
∗Email: antonia.masucci@inria.fr
†Email: alonso.silva@alcatel-lucent.com To whom corre-
spondence should be addressed.
marketing. This aggregated value of a customer
has been called the network value of a customer.
If each customer was making a buying decision in-
dependently of all other customers, then we should
only consider the intrinsic value of a customer (i.e.,
the expected profit from sales to him). However,
an individual’s decision to buy a product or service
is often strongly influenced by his friends, acquain-
tances, etc. A customer whose intrinsic value is
lower than the cost of marketing may be worth
marketing to when his network value is consid-
ered. Conversely, marketing to a profitable con-
sumer may be redundant if network effects already
make him very likely to buy [7].
Most of the existing literature assumes there is
an incumbent that holds the market and a chal-
lenger who needs to allocate advertisement through
direct marketing for certain individuals in order to
promote the challenger product or service. Notable
exceptions to that trend are the works on com-
petitive influence in social networks of Bharathi et
al. [1], Sanjeev and Kearns [14], He and Kempe [17],
Borodin et al. [4] and Chasparis and Shamma [5].
Bharathi et al. [1] proposed a generalization of
the independent cascade model [12] and gave a
(1 − 1/e) approximation algorithm for computing
the best response to an already known opponent’s
strategy and proved that the price of competition
of the game (resulting from the lack of coordina-
tion among the agents) is at most 2. Sanjeev and
Kearns [14] considered two independent functions
denoted switching function and selection function.
The switching function takes into account the prob-
ability of a consumer switching from non-adoption
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to adoption and the selection function specifies,
conditional on switching, the probability that the
consumer adopts one of them. Both players simul-
taneously choose some number of nodes to initially
seed. The authors make the simplifying assump-
tion that once a node is infected, it never switches
again, and proceed to study some specific fami-
lies of switching and adoption functions. He and
Kempe [17] motivated by [14] studied the price
of anarchy of that framework and found an up-
per bound of 2 on that price. Borodin et al. [4]
showed that for a broad family of competitive in-
fluence models is NP-hard to achieve an approxima-
tion that is better that the square root of the opti-
mal solution. Chasparis and Shamma [5] found op-
timal advertising policies using dynamic program-
ming based on the models of [8] and [10].
In the present work, our focus is different from
previously described works where the focus was
to which potential customers to market, assuming
that we have knowledge about the cost of adoption
of potential customers, while the focus in our work
is on how many resources to allocate to potential
customers for them to prefer one product or service
versus another. We are interested on the scenario
when two competing marketing campaigns need to
simultaneously decide how many resources to allo-
cate to potential customers to advertise their prod-
ucts. The process and dynamics by which influence
is spread is given by the voter model.
Under that model, our main results are the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 1. Given a graph G = (V,E) repre-
senting a social network of n potential customers.
The symmetric strategic resource allocation prob-
lem by only taking into account the intrinsic value
of the customers, for any target time τ , is given by
a probability distribution function F ∗ of x ∈ ∆n−1,
such that each vector coordinate xi is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 2B/n] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where B is
the available budget and ∆n−1 is the set of available
allocations.
Theorem 2. Given a graph G = (V,E) represent-
ing a social network of n potential customers. The
symmetric strategic resource allocation problem for
target time τ has a solution given by a probability
distribution function F ∗τ of x ∈ ∆
n−1, such that
each vector coordinate xi is uniformly distributed
on [0, 2B
∑n
j=1M
τ (i, j)] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where
B is the available budget, M is the normalized tran-
sition matrix and ∆n−1 is the set of available allo-
cations. Moreover, the long term case has a so-
lution given by a probability distribution function
F ∗∞ of x ∈ ∆
n−1, such that each vector coordi-
nate xi is uniformly distributed on [0, Bdi/|E|] for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where B is the available budget, di
is the degree of potential customer i, |E| is the total
number of edges of the graph and ∆n−1 is the set
of available allocations.
Theorem 3. The price of competition of the game
(resulting from lack of coordination among the
agents) is unbounded.
Theorem 1 gives an optimal policy for the allo-
cation of resources in the case when we consider
potential customers in isolation or their intrinsic
value, while Theorem 2 gives an optimal policy for
the allocation of resources in the case when we also
include the network value of potential customers.
Theorem 3 gives the price of competition (result-
ing from the lack of coordination among the agents)
for the strategic allocation problem. We notice that
this is a very different result than the one obtained
by Bharathi et al. [1] where they found that the
price of competition is at most a factor of 2 when
the focus is on which potential customers to recruit.
1.1 Related Work
The (meta) problem of influence maximization was
first defined by Domingos and Richardson [7, 27].
They studied this problem in a probabilistic set-
ting and provided heuristics to compute an influ-
ence maximizing set. Following this work, Kempe
et al. [19, 20] and Mossel and Roch [23], based on
the results of Nemhauser et al. [26] and Vetta [31],
proved that for very natural activation functions
(monotone and submodular or in economic terms,
with decreasing marginal utility), the function of
the expected number of active nodes at termina-
tion is a submodular function and thus can be
approximated through a greedy approach with a
(1−1/e−ε)-approximation algorithm for the spread
maximization set problem. A slightly different
model but with similar flavor, the voter model,
was introduced by Clifford and Sudbury [6] and
Holley and Liggett [18]. In that model of social
network, Even-Dar and Shapira [9] found an exact
solution to the spread maximization set problem
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when all the nodes have the same cost and provided
an FPTAS (Fully Polynomial Time Approximation
Scheme is an algorithm that for any ε approximates
the optimal solution up to an error (1 + ε) in time
poly(n/ε)) for the case in which different nodes may
have different costs.
In this work, we study the case when two mar-
keting campaigns competing to promote a product
or service need to decide how many resources to
allocate to potential customers to advertise their
product or service. Other works related to compet-
itive influence where the already described [1, 4, 5,
14, 17].
To study this case, we use recent advances of
game theory, and in particular of Colonel Blotto
games. In the simplest version of the Colonel Blotto
game, two generals want to capture three equally
valued battlefields. Each general disposes of one di-
visible unit of military resources. The generals have
to simultaneously allocate these resources across
the three battlefields. A battlefield is captured by a
general if he allocates more resources there than his
opponent. The goal of each general is to maximize
the number of captured battlefields.
The relationship between Colonel Blotto games
and our work is the following. We establish a paral-
lel between the marketing campaigns and the gen-
erals; and between the potential customers and the
battlefields. Each marketing campaign needs to
strategically allocate advertising resources to out-
perform the competing marketing campaign. This
needs to be done while knowing that the compet-
ing marketing campaign is trying to do the same.
It is thus a typical situation in which game the-
ory comes into play. In our case, of course, we will
not be dealing with three potential customers so
we need to extend this case to include any number
of potential customers. By including the network
value of customers, each potential customer will not
be equally valued so we will need also to consider
different payoffs for different potential customers.
The Colonel Blotto game, was first solved for
the case of three battlefields by Borel [2, 3]. For
the case of equally valued battlefields, also known
as homogeneous battlefields case, this result was
generalized for any number of battlefields by Gross
and Wagner [16]. Roberson [28] focused on the
case of homogeneous battlefields and different bud-
gets (also known as asymmetric budgets case).
Gross [15] proved the existence and a method to
construct the joint probability distribution. Laslier
and Picard [22] and Thomas [30] provided alterna-
tive methods to construct the joint distribution by
extending the disc method proposed by Gross and
Wagner [16]. We will extensively use the work of
Gross [15] to derive our results.
The plan of this work is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide some preliminaries about the
tools we use to find the optimal strategy. The
reader acquainted with game theory and Colonel
Blotto games can skip this section. In Section 3,
we explain the voter model of social networks. In
Section 4, we derive the main results of this work,
and in Section 5, we conclude this work and provide
future perspectives for continuing our work.
2 Preliminaries on game the-
ory
Colonel Blotto games (or Divide a Dollar games) in
their classic version are a class of two-person zero-
sum games, in which both players need to simulta-
neously allocate limited resources over several ob-
jects. Colonel Blotto games are usually described
in a military context where the limited resources
are troops and the objects are battlefields. In that
context, the player devoting the most troops (or
resources) to a battlefield (or object) captures that
battlefield (and the payoff associated with that bat-
tlefield) and its total payoff is the sum of the indi-
vidual payoffs across captured battlefields. To ana-
lyze these games, we need to introduce some basic
concepts in game theory.
In this subsection, we follow the notation of [31].
Consider we have two agents (or players) and dis-
joint groundsets V1 and V2. Each element in Vi rep-
resents an act that agent i may make, i ∈ {1, 2}, in
our case, the allocation of troops to a battlefield.
Let ai ⊆ Vi be an action (set of acts) available to
agent i, for example, the set of troops allocations
across battlefields. We want to restrict the set of
actions an agent may make; thus we may not allow
every subset of Vi to be a feasible action. We let
Ai = {ai ⊆ Vi : ai is a feasible action} be the set of
all available actions to agent i. In our case, the set
of possible allocations is limited by the budget of
the agents. We call Ai the action space for agent i.
A pure strategy is one in which the agent decides to
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carry out a specific action. A mixed strategy is one
in which the agent decides upon an action accord-
ing to some probability distribution. The strategy
space Si of agent i is the set of mixed strategies. We
let A = A1 × A2, S = S1 × S2, and V = V1 ∪ V2.
Given an action set A ∈ A, let A⊕a′i denote the ac-
tion set obtained if agent i changes its action from
ai to a
′
i. Similarly, given a strategy set S ∈ S, let
S ⊕ s′i denote the strategy set obtained if agent i
changes its strategy from si to s
′
i. For every agent
i, there is a private utility function αi : 2
V → R.
The expected value of αi(S) on the strategy set S,
denoted α¯i(S), is given by
α¯i(S) =
∑
A∈A
αi(A)P(A|S),
where P(A|S) is the probability that action set A
is implemented given that the agents are using the
strategy set S. The goal of each agent is to max-
imize its expected private utility. We say that a
set of strategies S ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no
agent has an incentive to change strategy. That is,
for any agent i,
α¯i(S) ≥ α¯i(S ⊕ s
′
i) ∀s
′
i ∈ Si.
We say that a Nash equilibrium is a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium if, for each agent i, si is a
pure strategy. Otherwise, we say that the Nash
equilibrium is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this work the term equilibrium refers
to Nash equilibrium, although, since the game is
a zero sum game, these equilibrium strategies are
also optimal strategies.
The following result, due to Nash [25], shows that
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium for any
finite game.
Theorem 4 (Nash [25]). Any finite, k-person,
non-co- operative game has at least one Nash equi-
librium.
2.1 Colonel Blotto games
In this subsection, we include the notation of [30].
As previously said in Section 1, in the simplest ver-
sion of the Colonel Blotto game, two generals want
to capture three equally valued battlefields. Each
general disposes of one divisible unit of military re-
sources and the generals have to simultaneously al-
locate these resources across the three battlefields.
A battlefield is captured by a general if he allo-
cates more resources there than his opponent and
the goal of each general is to maximize the number
of captured battlefields.
In that game, a pure strategy for a player, de-
noted X , is a 3-dimensional allocation vector x =
(x1, x2, x3) where xi is the amount of resources allo-
cated to the ith battlefield for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The set
of pure strategies is the 2-dimensional unit simplex
∆2 = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0 and x1+x2+x3 = 1}.
A mixed strategy is a tri-
variate distribution function
F : ∆2 → [0, 1]. Similarly for his enemy, de-
noted Y , we define y the allocation vector, yi
the proportion of resources allocated to the ith
battlefield for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∆2 the set of pure
strategies and G : ∆2 → [0, 1] a mixed strategy.
The natural extension of the classic version of
the Colonel Blotto game is to study the case with n
battlefields where each captured battlefield gives a
different payoff. Consider that we have two players,
denoted X and Y , and n objects. Player X has
budget BX and it can allocate for an object i a
proportion of his budget xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Similarly,
player Y has budget BY and it can allocate for an
object i a proportion of his budget yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In this work, we limit ourselves to the case when
both players have the same total divisible budget,
i.e., BX = BY , and without loss of generality we
consider this budget to be equal to 1. We consider
this to simplify the derivations, however it is easy
to derive the results by considering the budgets to
be equal to B instead of 1.
For the general case, a pure strat-
egy for player X can be written as
an n-dimensional allocation vector
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ∈ [0, 1],
where xi represents the fraction of budget allocated
to front i. Thus, the set of pure strategies is the
(n− 1)-dimensional simplex
∆(n−1) = {(x1, . . . , xn) : xi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
n∑
i=1
xi = 1}.
A mixed strategy is an n-
variate distribution function
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F : ∆(n−1) → [0, 1]. Let Fi denote the ith one-
dimensional marginal of F , i.e., the unconditional
distribution of xi.
The object i has an associated non-negative pay-
off Ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote the sum of the
payoffs of all objects by A, i.e.,
A =
n∑
i=1
Ai.
For all i, let us define
ai =
Ai
A
,
which represents the relative value of object i and
note that
n∑
k=1
ai = 1.
We assume that the player devoting the most
resources to a battlefield captures that battlefield.
Ties are resolved by flipping a coin.
For any pair (x,y) of pure strategies, the excess
aggregate value for playerX , denoted by g(x,y), of
objects captured by player X if he plays the pure
strategy x while player Y plays the pure strategy
y is given by
g(x,y) =
n∑
i=1
aisgn(xi − yi), (1)
where sgn(·) is the sign function defined as
sgn(u) =


1 if u > 0,
0 if u = 0,
−1 if u < 0.
(2)
The excess aggregate value g(x,y) is the gain for
pure strategy x against pure strategy y.
Definition 1. We define the Colonel Blotto game
as the two-player, zero-sum game defined by the
payoff function g.
If F and G are two mixed strategies the payoff
to mixed strategy F against mixed strategy G is:
K(F,G) =
∫
x∈∆(n−1)
∫
y∈∆(n−1)
g(x,y) dF (x) dG(y).
(3)
The expected payoff for mixed strategy F against
pure strategy y is given by
K(y) =
∫
x∈∆(n−1)
g(x,y) dF (x). (4)
The game is symmetric so to prove that a strategy
is optimal we only need to show that K(y) ≥ 0 for
every y.
From eq. (1) and eq. (4), we have that
K(y) =
n∑
i=1
ai (P(xi > yi)− P(yi > xi)) . (5)
We assume n ≥ 2 otherwise the game always
ends in a tie.
We observe the following:
(a) For the case n = 2 (originally solved in [16]), it
is optimal to put all the budget in the object
of maximum value, i.e., in i∗ ∈ {1, 2} such that
ai∗ = max{a1, a2}. In case a1 = a2, choose
any of them. Indeed, without loss of generality
assume the second object gives higher payoff
than the first one, i.e. a2 ≥ a1, then the ex-
pected payoff against a strategy y = (y, 1− y)
will be
a1sgn(−y) + a2sgn(y) ≥ 0,
which always gives a non-negative payoff for all
y ∈ [0, 1].
(b) For the case when there exists an object i with
relative value ai ≥ 1/2, then the optimal strat-
egy is to put all the budget in object i. In-
deed, without loss of generality assume the
last object has relative value an ≥ 1/2, then
the expected payoff against a strategy y =
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) will be
n−1∑
i=1
aisgn(−yi) + ansgn
(
n−1∑
i=1
yi
)
≥ 0,
which always gives a non-negative payoff.
(c) For the case when there exists an object i with
relative value ai = 0, then from the payoff func-
tion, the optimal strategy is not to put any
budget in object i.
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From (b) and (c), in the following we assume that
0 < ai < 1/2, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (6)
or equivalently that
0 < Ai <
∑
j 6=i
Aj , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It can be shown that under the previous assump-
tion for n > 2 there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the general case. Indeed, consider
a pure strategy x, select the object of minimum
value where the pure strategy is not zero. Then
x will lose with respect to the strategy y that al-
locates no resources to the i-th object and more
resources to all the other objects, i.e.,
yi = 0, yj = xj +
xi
n− 1
∀j 6= i.
Therefore, we need to search for optimal mixed
strategies. For the case of three battlefields, Gross
and Wagner [16] proved the existence of a mixed
strategy solution given as follows.
Theorem 5 (Gross and Wagner [16]). For n = 3,
the Colonel Blotto game with heterogeneous bat-
tlefield values has a mixed strategy equilibrium in
which the marginal distribution over front i is uni-
form on [0, 2ai] for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
We need to construct a joint distribution such
that each marginal distribution is uniform on
[0, 2ai] for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and such that the sum of the
values given by the marginal distributions is equal
to 1. The difficulty comes from this last condition,
otherwise we could always define a joint distribu-
tion from its marginal distributions. In the follow-
ing, we show how this joint distribution can be con-
structed. In the case of three battlefields, there is a
geometric construction of the joint n-variate distri-
bution function with uniform marginal distribution
functions.
Proof. We construct a non-degenerate triangle hav-
ing sides of length a1, a2 and a3 (see Fig. 1), and
then inscribe a circle within it and erect a hemi-
sphere upon this circle. We notice that we can
construct a non-degenerate triangle since a degen-
erate triangle would violate the assumption given
by eq. (6). Then, we choose a point from a den-
sity uniformly distributed over the surface of the
hemisphere and project this point straight down
into the plane of the triangle (we denote by P
the projected point over the plane). We then di-
vide the forces in respective proportion to the tri-
angular areas subtended by P and the sides, i.e.,
x1 : x2 : x3 = A1 : A2 : A3 (see Fig. 1).
Let Fi(xi) denote the respective marginal distri-
bution function of Blotto’s continuous mixed strat-
egy F . Blotto’s expectation from battlefield i is
given by
ai[1− Fi(yi)]− aiFi(yi) = ai[1− 2Fi(y)],
and hence his total expectation is given by
K(y) =
3∑
i=1
ai[1− 2Fi(yi)]. (7)
Let hi denote the altitude of the triangle of area
Ai subtended by P . From a well-known property
of the surface area of a sphere, we see that hi is
uniformly distributed over (0, 2r), r being the ra-
dius of the sphere. Now, Ai =
1
2aihi, and hence
Ai is uniformly distributed over (0, air). Also,
since x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 and x1 : x2 : x3 =
A1 : A2 : A3, it follows that xi =
Ai
∆ where ∆
is the area of the originally constructed triangle.
Thus xi is uniformly distributed over (0,
air
∆ ). But
∆ = 12 (a1r + a2r + a3r), hence xi is uniformly dis-
tributed over
(
0, 2ai
a1+a2+a3
)
, i.e.,
Fi(xi) = min
[
1,
a1 + a2 + a3
2ai
xi
]
.
Consequently, from eq. (7),
K(y) =
3∑
i=1
ai
{
1− 2min
[
1,
a1 + a2 + a3
2ai
yi
]}
.
Note that if α > 0, y ≥ 0, then min(1, αy) ≥ αy,
and hence
K(y) ≥
3∑
i=1
ai
{
1−
a1 + a2 + a3
ai
yi
}
,
= a1 + a2 + a3 − (a1 + a2 + a3)
3∑
i=1
yi
= 0
since
∑3
i=1 yi = 1.
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a2
a1
a3
h1
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P
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A3
Figure 1: Triangle of lengths a1, a2 and a3.
For the case of any number of battlefields n,
Gross [15] proved the existence and a method to
construct such joint distributions.
Theorem 6 (Gross [15]). Consider the Colonel
Blotto Game with heterogeneous battlefield values.
Let F ∗ be a probability distribution of x ∈ ∆n−1
such that each vector coordinate xi is uniformly
distributed on [0, 2ai] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then
(F ∗, F ∗) constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We notice that Friedman [11] used this solution
for advertisement expenditures without consider-
ing the network value of customers. Robertson [28]
showed that for homogeneous battlefield values
(ai = 1/n, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) uniform univariate
marginals are also a necessary condition for equi-
librium. Laslier and Picard [22] and Thomas [30]
provided alternative methods to construct the joint
distribution. In the following we will use Theo-
rem 6 to the strategic resource allocation on the
voter model of social networks.
3 Voter model
The voter model is one of the most natural prob-
abilistic models to represent the diffusion of opin-
ions in social networks. In each step, each potential
customer changes its opinion by choosing one of its
neighbors at random and adopting its neighbor’s
opinion.
The voter model is quite different from the
threshold model [19, 20], however it still has the
same key property that a person is more likely to
change its opinion to the one held by most of its
neighbors. It has another characteristic to its ad-
vantage, the fact that in the threshold models once
a node adopts a product or service it stays with that
product or service forever. These models are called
monotone models of diffusion. However, the voter
model allows to change preferences, which may be
more suitable for non-monotone processes.
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with self-
loops where V is the set of nodes in the graph which
represent the potential customers of the compet-
ing marketing campaigns and E is the set of edges
which represent the influence between individuals.
We consider that the graph G has n nodes, i.e.
|V | = n. As we will see in the following, the use
of the same notation n, as for the number of bat-
tlefields, is not a coincidence since each potential
customer will represent a battlefield for competing
marketing campaigns.
For a node v ∈ V , we denote by N(v) the set of
neighbors of v in G, i.e. N(v) = {u ∈ V : {u, v} ∈
E} and by dv the degree of node v, i.e. dv = |N(v)|.
We recall that the players of the game are the
competing marketing campaigns and the nodes of
the graph correspond to the potential customers.
We label a node v ∈ V by its initial preference be-
tween different players, X or Y , denoted by func-
tion f0. We denote by f0(v) = 1 when node v ∈ V
prefers the product promoted by marketing cam-
paign X , f0(v) = −1 when node v prefers the
product promoted by marketing campaign Y , and
f0(v) = 0 when node v is indifferent between both
products.
We assume that the quantity of marketing bud-
get allocated to node i determines its initial pref-
erence, i.e.,
f0(i) =


1 if xi > yi,
0 if xi = yi,
−1 if xi < yi.
We notice that f0(i) corresponds to sgn(xi − yi)
where sgn(·) is given by eq. (2). We also observe
that since the bids are real numbers, ties have mea-
sure zero. However, in the unlikely event that bids
coincide in the maximum, we choose uniformly at
random the winner between both players. This de-
fines a new function and for simplicity we use the
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same notation,
f0(i) =


1 if xi > yi,
1 if xi = yi and R = 1,
−1 if xi = yi and R = 0,
−1 if xi < yi,
where R is a Bernoulli random variable with success
probability equal to 1/2.
The evolution of the system will be described
by the voter model. Starting from any arbitrary
initial preference assignment to the vertices of G,
at each time t ≥ 1, each node picks uniformly at
random one of its neighbors and adopts its opin-
ion. More formally, starting from any assignment
f0 : V → {−1, 1}, we inductively define
ft+1(v) =
{
1 with prob. |{u∈N(v):ft(u)=1}||N(v)| ,
−1 with prob. |{u∈N(v):ft(u)=−1}||N(v)| .
The objective function for player X is to maxi-
mize at a certain target time τ the expected number
of nodes:
E
[∑
v∈V
fτ (v)
]
.
We thus define the strategic resource allocation
problem as follows.
Definition 2 (Competitive Influence). Let G =
(V,E) be a graph with n nodes representing a so-
cial network with n potential customers. Consider
two players, X and Y , which represent two compet-
ing marketing campaigns with equal budget B which
need to simultaneously allocate resources across po-
tential customers. A node i ∈ V with respective
allocations xi and yi such that xi > yi (or yi > xi)
will choose the product or service proposed by player
X (or Y ). Otherwise, if xi = yi, it will flip a coin
to decide between both marketing campaigns. Then
the strategic resource allocation problem is the prob-
lem of finding an initial assignment of resources
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) for player X that will maxi-
mize at a target time τ the expectation
E
[∑
v∈V
fτ (v)
]
subject to the budget constraint∑
v∈V
xv ≤ B.
4 Results
In this section, we establish the main results of our
work, we find the optimal marginal probability den-
sity function when we consider the intrinsic value of
potential customers and when we consider the total
value of potential customers by incorporating their
network value. We also give a distance to compare
both probability density functions.
We notice that in the voter model, the probabil-
ity that node v adopts the opinion of one its neigh-
bors u is precisely 1/|N(v)|. Equivalently, this is
the probability that a random walk of length 1 that
starts at v ends up in u. Generalizing this obser-
vation by induction on t, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Even-Dar and Shapira [9]). Let
ptu,v denote the probability that a random walk of
length t starting at node u stops at node v. Then
the probability that after t iterations of the voter
model, node u will adopt the opinion that node v
had at time t = 0 is precisely ptu,v.
Let M be the normalized transition matrix of G,
i.e.
M(v, u) = 1/|N(v)| if u ∈ N(v).
By linearity of expectation, we have that for
player X
E
[∑
v∈V
fτ (v)
]
=
∑
v∈V
(P[fτ(v) = 1]− P[fτ (v) = −1]) .
For a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we denote by 1S the
0/1 column vector whose ith entry is 1 if and only
if i ∈ S. Then, the probability that a random walk
of length t starting at u ends in v, is given by the
(u, v) entry of the matrix M t, or equivalently, by
1T{u}M
t1{v}. Then
P[ft(v) = 1] =
∑
u∈V
ptu,vP[f0(u) = 1]
=
∑
u∈V
1T{u}M
t1{v}P[xu > yu].
Similarly,
P[ft(v) = −1] =
∑
u∈V
1T{u}M
t1{v}P[xu < yu].
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Then
E
[∑
v∈V
ft(v)
]
=
∑
v∈V
∑
u∈V
1T{u}M
t1{v} (P[xu > yu]− P[xu < yu]) .
(8)
If we are interested only on the intrinsic value
of potential customers, this case is equivalent to
consider that each node is influenced only by itself,
i.e.,
M(u, v) =
{
1 u = v,
0 u 6= v.
Equivalently, that M = In×n, where In×n is the
n× n identity matrix. Then, for every target time
τ we have that
E
[∑
v∈V
fτ (v)
]
=
∑
u∈V
(P[xu > yu]− P[xu < yu]) .
From equation (5), we notice that this case is equiv-
alent to the homogeneous Colonel Blotto, i.e., with
relative values ai = 1/n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and from
Theorem 6, we are able to conclude Theorem 1.
If we consider a complete graph, then the nor-
malized transition matrix is given by
M =
1
n


1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
...
...
. . . 1
1 1 . . . 1

 .
We notice that M t = M for all t ∈ N. Thus inde-
pendently of the target time τ , the objective func-
tion for player X is to maximize:
E
[∑
v∈V
fτ (v)
]
=
∑
u∈V
(P[xu > yu]− P[xu < yu]) .
Similarly to the previous case, from eq. (5), we see
that this particular case is equivalent to the homo-
geneous Colonel Blotto game and the solution is
the same as in the intrinsic value case.
If we could only solve this challenge in the intrin-
sic case and the complete graph it would not be a
compelling model. However, as we will see we can
compute this when we are interested on much more
general cases.
Indeed, from eq. (8), redefining
au =
∑
v∈V
M t(u, v),
we have the optimal strategy from Theorem 6 and
we conclude the first part of Theorem 2.
Recall the well known fact that for any graph G
with self-loops, a random walk starting from any
node v, converges to the steady state distribution
after O(n3) steps (see [24]). Then the (unique)
steady state distribution is that the probability of
being at node u is du/2|E|. In other words, if
t≫ n3 then M tu,v = (1 + o(1))du/2|E|.
If we have t ≫ n5, the error in each entry is
within a factor of 1 + o(1/n2) of the exact value.
Then
K(y) = o
(
1
n
)
+
n∑
i=1
di
2|E|
(P(xi > yi)−P(xi < yi)).
(9)
Then, in the long term, i.e., when t → +∞,
from Theorem 6, the optimal strategy is to play
a mixed strategy such that the vector coordinate
xi is uniformly distributed between 0 and di/|E|,
which concludes Theorem 2.
x
f(x)
n/2
2/n
Figure 2: Probability density function for the opti-
mal marginal allocation for the intrinsic value case.
4.1 Distance measure between the
intrinsic value and the total
value of potential customers
In this subsection, we are interested to find the dis-
tance measure between the intrinsic value of po-
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xf(x)
|E|/di
di/|E|
Figure 3: Probability density function for the opti-
mal marginal allocation for the total value case.
tential customers and the total value of poten-
tial customers. From Theorem 1, we know that
if we only take into account the intrinsic value
of customers, the optimal strategy for the long
term is to choose from marginal distributions uni-
form x
(1)
i ∼ U(0, 2/n) (see Fig. 2). From Theo-
rem 2, we know that, by also taking into account
the network value of the customers, the optimal
strategy is to choose from marginal distributions
uniform x
(2)
i ∼ U(0, di/|E|) (see Fig. 3).
The marginal distribution of the difference, Z =
x
(1)
i − x
(2)
i , is given by:
• For the case di|E| ≤
2
n
:
fZ(z) =


|E|
di
+ n2
|E|
di
z − 2
n
≤ z ≤ di|E| −
2
n
,
n
2
di
|E| −
2
n
≤ z ≤ 0,
−n2
|E|
di
z + n2 0 ≤ z ≤
di
|E| .
• For the case di|E| ≥
2
n
:
fZ(z) =


|E|
di
+ n2
|E|
di
z − 2
n
≤ z ≤ 0,
|E|
di
0 ≤ z ≤ di|E| −
2
n
,
−n2
|E|
di
z + n2
di
|E| −
2
n
≤ z ≤ di|E| .
We notice that in both cases fZ is a trapezoidal
distribution of mean
µZ =
1
2
(
di
|E|
−
2
n
)
,
and variance
σ2Z =
1
12
((
2
n
)2
+
(
di
|E|
)2)
.
However, the marginal distribution of the differ-
ence is not a good distance measure since one of the
properties that one would like to have is the iden-
tity of indiscernibles, i.e., that the distance between
two equal probability distributions is zero. Because
of that, we consider the total variation distance of
probability measures.
Definition 3. For µ and ν probability measures on
R. The total variation distance between µ and ν is
defined as
δ(µ, ν) =
1
2
sup
f
∣∣∣∣
∫
f(t) dµ(t) −
∫
f(t) dν(t)
∣∣∣∣ ,
where the supremum is taken over continuous func-
tions which are bounded by 1 and vanish at infinity.
Informally, the total variation distance is the
largest possible difference between the probabilities
that the two probability distributions can assign to
the same event (see Fig. 4).
Thus, we have the following two cases:
• For the case di|E| ≤
2
n
:
δ(x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i ) = 1−
n
2
di
|E|
≥ 0.
• For the case di|E| ≥
2
n
:
δ(x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i ) = 1−
|E|
di
2
n
≥ 0.
We define the average total variation between
both strategies across all the nodes as
δ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i ).
This distance has some good properties (non-
negativity, identity of indiscernibles, symmetry, tri-
angle inequality). For the long term, it can be seen
that for any k-regular graph, δ = 0. Give the par-
ticular probability densities considered, the effect
of δ will be given by how much different are di|E|
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xf(x)
|E|/di
n/2
di/|E|2/n
Figure 4: Total variation between both probability
density functions (shaded region).
from 2
n
. For example, for n ≥ 2, a graph with self-
loops where all other edges are given by one node
connected to every other node, there is one node
of degree (n + 1) and (n − 1) nodes of degree 3.
The total number of edges in the graph is 2n − 1.
Therefore, the average variation is given by
1
n
{
(n− 1)
(
1−
n
2
3
2n− 1
)
+
(
1−
2
n
2n− 1
n+ 1
)}
=
(n− 1)(n− 2)n(n+ 1) + 2(2n− 1)(n− 1)(n− 2)
2(2n− 1)n2(n+ 1)
,
which converges to 1/4 when n → ∞. As we have
seen, this is very different for other graphs, for ex-
ample for k-regular graphs.
4.2 Price of competition
In this subsection, we study the price of compe-
tition in the strategic resource allocation problem
for competitive influence. We define the price of
competition as the ratio of the total cost to a com-
petitive duopoly to that of a monopoly. Informally,
it is the price resulting from the lack of coordina-
tion among the agents [1].
Until now, we have considered that for any ǫ > 0
such that xi− yi ≥ ǫ user i will choose the product
or service of player X versus the product or ser-
vice of player Y . Under that scenario the price of
competition will be unbounded. Indeed, the cost
for two marketing campaigns cooperating (as in a
monopoly) could put together for each user ε/n
(thus ε for the whole population), while for the
non-cooperating scenario each marketing campaign
needs to invest a budget ofB > 0 for the whole pop-
ulation, thus the price of competition is B/ε which
is unbounded for ε→ 0.
We notice that this is a very different result than
the one obtained by Bharathi et al. [1] where they
found that the price of competition is at most a
factor of 2 when the focus is on which potential
customers to recruit. We have thus obtained The-
orem 3.
5 Conclusions and Future
Work
5.1 Conclusions
In this work, we were interested on the strategic
resource allocation of competing marketing cam-
paigns who need to simultaneously decide how
many resources to allocate to potential customers
to advertise their products. Using game theory,
and in particular Colonel Blotto games, we were
able to completely characterize the optimal strate-
gic allocation of resources for the voter model of
social networks. We were able to prove that for
this case the price of competition is unbounded.
5.2 Future Work
One generalization to several marketing campaigns
consists on the simple case of analyzing pairwise
competitions as previously described. This case has
the advantage that we already know the solution,
given by the results of the previous section. How-
ever, this is not a realistic case for competitions in
which each customer chooses only one product from
the competing marketing campaigns. To see this,
consider the example of three competing marketing
campaignsX , Y , and Z and four customers (for the
sake of simplification). Consider the pure strate-
gies x = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2), y = (0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)
and z = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0). In that case, the pairwise
competition gives that X has captured 3 out of 5
potential customers to Y , and that X has captured
3 out of 5 potential customers to Z, thus winning
in a pairwise competition against both competitors.
However, since each customer will only choose one
product, the final outcome will be 2 customers for
Y , 2 customers for Z, while only 1 customer for X .
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For exploring this generalization, we need to
search for another framework. We notice that
there is a tight relationship between Colonel Blotto
games and auctions. A Colonel Blotto game can be
seen as a simultaneous all-pay auction of multiple
items of complete information. An all-pay auction
is an auction in which every bidder must forfeit its
bid regardless of whether it wins the object which
is awarded to the highest bidder. It is an auction of
complete information since the value of the object
is known to every bidder. In another context, this
was already noted by Szentes and Rosenthal [29],
Roberson [28] and Kvasov [21].
Through this new perspective, we can general-
ize Colonel Blotto games to more than two players,
where the winner of an object will be the highest
bidder for that object. We notice that this is a
different generalization than the work of Goldman
and Page [13] who consider another payment func-
tion. This general framework does not have yet a
known solution and we consider it an interesting
extension to study.
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